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Abstract:  Icelandic university teachers, the Ministry of Finance and the University
of Iceland have been conducting an interesting experiment by changing the form of
remuneration of university teachers in a fundamental way.  This paper accounts for
the development of university teachers salaries the last 20-30 years and gives the
details of the remuneration system as well as its impact on wage development and
wage dispersion within the university community.  The effect of the changed system
of remuneration on scholary productivity is also discussed.
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Oregon.  Julian Thorsteinsson corrected style and grammar.  Needless to say, none of
the above mention are responsible for the content of this paper or the remaining
errors.I.  Introduction
The University of Iceland enjoys considerable autonomy with respect to governance
of its internal affairs.  That autonomy does not extend to all matters of internal
governance, however.  Determining the remuneration of university employees, both
academic and non-academic, is a case in point.  Since 1986, the Ministry of Finance
has had the formal authority to negotiate wage contracts and has exercised that
authority with rigor.   A growing number of university administrators and employees
have perceived the remuneration system as a straitjacket that has hindered the
production of quality research and teaching.  To mitigate this problem, they started a
movement that eventually revolutionized the system.  The objective of this paper is to
explain the current system and what preceded it, as well as to address the question as
to whether the goal of increased scholarly productivity has been met.
II.  Historical background
In 1942, the University Teachers Union (UTU) was inaugurated with the primary
purpose and function of  fostering social contacts among the UTU members and
administering the few assets collectively held by the teachers at the University of
Iceland.
3  The UTU was reorganized and its by-laws rewritten in 1969 with a view to
                                                   
3 For example the UTU managed the so-called “vacation-fund” for University
teachers.  Icelandic employers contribute a given (small) percentage of payroll to the
union “vacation funds” of their employees.  Many of these funds were used to buy
summer houses for rental to union members at a subsidized price.establishing the UTU as a representative body for its members and a labour union.
Prior to 1986, Icelandic civil servants did have the right to unionise and to bargain
wage-agreements with the Ministry of Finance and/or the municipalities.  However,
the important difference between the rights of civil service and private sector unions
was that public employees did not have the right to strike.  Negotiations involved a
two-step process. First, the Alliance of public employees’ unions and the Ministry of
Finance would negotiate an agreement covering general issues, such as defining non-
overtime hours and a general salary scale setting out the highest and the lowest
admissible monthly pay levels.  Secondly, the individual unions for public employees
would negotiate an agreement on issues that were of specific concern to that union,
such as the level of a given job in the general salary scale. In the event that
negotiations failed, a special Salary Tribunal composed of members appointed by the
negotiating parties and the Supreme Court of Iceland would be convened.  The Salary
Tribunal was to consider individual cases with reference to the relative progression of
salaries in the country, ensuring that its decisions should not destabilize the Icelandic
economy.  Hence, the Ministry of Finance typically left the salary decision to the
Salary Tribunal.  The political implication of this process was that the Minister, who
is a politician and a member of Alﬂingi (Icelandic Parliament), was not directly
involved in salary decisions. By leaving contentious remuneration issues to the Salary
Tribunal, the Minister of Finance could avoid making enemies amongst employees in
both the public and private sectors.  In practice, the institutional set-up was such that
the UTU could only have an indirect influence on the evolution of its members’
salaries. The Union collected detailed data on the salaries of its members, on salaries
of colleagues in other countries, and on salaries of equally educated and qualified
colleagues in the public and private sectors in Iceland.  Those data would be presentedat sessions of the Salary Tribunal.  The Ministry of Finance would present
information on recent overall wage developments in Iceland, give an account of the
alleged productivity growth and the economic leeway for wage increases, stressing
the above-mentioned responsibility of the Salary Tribunal not to destabilize the
Icelandic economy.  The number of public employee man-years doubled between
1970 and 1985, increasing from 10,500 to 19,911 over that fifteen-year period.  Their
share in total employment increased from 12% to 16% during the same period.  As
civil servants became increasingly numerous, and as the Salary Tribunal produced
more verdicts, the sentiment grew among public sector employees that the Salary
Tribunal was more attentive to the arguments put forward by the Ministry of Finance
and the spokespersons for the municipalities than to those put forward by the
employees’ unions.  A growing perception amongst public sector employees  was that
the Salary Tribunal acted as an extended arm of the Ministry of Finance.  Hence, civil
service unions pressed hard for many years to gain the rights to bargain on an equal
footing with ordinary unions.  Finally, in 1986, many civil service unions, including
the UTU, were granted the right to represent their members in salary-related matters
and to make binding agreements on their behalf.  Furthermore, along with other civil
service unions, the UTU won the right to take its members out in a strike in order to
force through a new wage agreement.  Hence, the Union was able to signal its
determination regarding wage claims.  The Minister of Finance/University of Iceland
and the UTU signed the first salary agreement in 1987.The early agreements were rather simple by today’s standards, characterized
by a flat salary for each category of professor
4, with pay increases by age bracket.
These agreements afforded little scope for rewarding productive professors, as
implementation was typically based on years of service rather than professional
achievements.
Base salaries of public employees in Iceland decreased dramatically in real
terms during the high-inflation years of the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially
after the abolition of inflation indexing in 1983. Institutions that employed academics
with marketable skills, such as engineers, architects, programmers and finance
specialists, suffered from the effects of brain-drain and severe difficulties recruiting
new employees.   Managers of those and other state institutions responded to the
shortage of supply of academics by increasing overtime payment.  The term
“unmeasured overtime” was invented and defined as payment for time spent on work-
related tasks carried out from home.  It was not unusual to add 20-30% to basic
monthly wages in this way.
School managers at all levels were initially less inclined to pay “unmeasured
overtime” for two reasons.  For one thing, since schoolteachers traditionally have
fewer marketable skills than engineers and architects, the brain drain was not as
obvious and imminent a problem in the school system as in other institutions.
Secondly, the teaching load was measured by the number of classroom hours and not
by hours spent in an office or reading at home.  However, as the custom of
“unmeasured overtime” became more widespread and as the best teachers (or those
                                                   
4 The categories are:  Professors, Docents and Lecturers, respectively comparable to
Full Professors, Associate Professors and Assistant Professors in US universities.with the most marketable skills) vanished, decision makers had to implement similar
methods to remunerate teachers.   Therefore, in the primary and secondary schools,
overtime was redefined to cover tasks that had previously been part of daytime duties.
At the university level, overtime payment for teaching was introduced in
1974.
5  The University Council had and still has the right to define what constitutes a
full-time job for a professor.  The Council decided in November 1973 that a professor
should, independent of rank, devote 10% of his or her working hours to internal
administrative services, 50% to teaching and 40% to research
6.  Teaching was the
only task subject to external measurement and control.  Thus, preparing and
conducting a 3/4-hour lecture is assumed to take up 4 hours of teacher time.
Workshops and exercises are assumed to take up less.  Furthermore, complicated rules
govern the estimation of teacher time devoted to grading exams and quizzes.  A 40-
year old associate professor was expected to deliver 769 hours in teaching and class
preparation each year.  This requirement could be met by giving three courses and
advising a few students working on their theses.  Up to 576 hours of overtime could
be claimed by a professor each year.  The overtime ceiling was later raised to 600
hours a year.  In order to fulfil this requirement, a professor would have to give three
                                                   
5 Researchers working on externally funded projects were also allowed to claim
overtime for research-related work.  Overtime for internally funded research was not
defined until 1989, when the so-called Research-contribution Fund (Vinnumatssjó›ur)
was established.
6 This was changed to 12% for administrative tasks, 48% for teaching and 40% for
research in 1986, although theUniversity Council did not formalize this decision until
September 1988.to four courses each semester and attract students as a thesis advisor.  In this context,
a professor could not accomplish much in terms of research.
Table 1:  Salary development for UTU, university-educated public employees and



























1982 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
1983 91.2 92.2 91.1 101
1984 84.9 84.6 84.0 70
1985 80.8 78.0 80.0 83
1986 94.3 97.0 101.0 98
1987 108.3 107.9 113.6 102
1988 103.2 105.0 109.8 99
1989 98.1 96.5 102.6 104
1990 94.5 93.5 100.1 92
1991 95.1 94.3 88
1992 96.0 94.2 92
1993 95.1 92.6 93
1994 94.7 96.1 89
1995 97.5 94.1 88
1996 103.5 100.4 91
1997 106.4 103.2 95
1998 124.2 126.2 131
1999 130.7 134.2 136
2000 143.6 140
2001 149.6 1502002 157
Note to table 1:  The figures are only indicative of the development of university
teachers’ wages as compared to wages of other workers.  Administrators at the
university have been members of the UTU since 1975.  The weight of administrators
in the total has increased over time.  This may imply that the overall development of
total wages for an average member of the UTU is somewhat different from the
development of the average total wage for university teachers.
Sources:  Hagskinna, p. 615 and table 6.9 in Sögulegt yfirlit hagtalna.
III.  First verdict of the Salary Committee
In 1996, salary decisions for full professors at the University of Iceland were moved
from the realm of collective bargaining to the so-called State Wage Terms
Committee, which was established by Parliamentary Act 120/1992.  The purpose of
establishing the State Wage Terms Committee was similar to that of the earlier Salary
Tribunal, i.e. to establish a channel of salary determination of government employees
that is not too prone to disputes.  The difference is that the State Wage Terms
Committee has fewer “clients” than the Salary Tribunal.  The State Wage Terms
Committee decides the salaries of upper rank, but not the highest-ranking civil
servants.  The High Level Civil Service Commission decides the salary of the
President, Members of Parliament, judges of the Supreme Court and permanent
secretaries of the Ministries.  A formal connection exists between the two bodies in
that the High Level Civil Service Commission appoints one of the members of the
State Wage Term Committee.  Understandably, there are also informal connections,
as decisions of the two bodies are based on similar data.  In addition to setting the
salaries of full professors, the State Wage Term Committee sets the salaries of priests
serving the State Church, primary-care doctors, the police, prison-wardens, etc.
Today the system for deciding the salaries of public sector employees in Iceland issuch that the salaries of the highest ranking officers are set by the High Level Civil
Service Commission, the salaries of the next level of officers are set by the State
Wage Term Committee and the salaries of the rank and file are subject to collective
bargaining between almost 50 unions and the Ministry of Finance
7.
The State Wage Term Committee has interpreted its mandate as that of setting
the total wage paid to employees who are subject to its decisions.  Hence, the
Committee has developed a system of base categories of jobs, each commanding the
same base salary with the possibility of additional payments calculated according to
documented workloads.
The State Wage Term Committee had already developed its own wage-
determination system when it was given the task of setting the salary of full
professors.  The Committee decided to adapt the system with as few alternations as
possible for the professors.
In its first salary decision for professors, the State Wage Term Committee
divided the group into five categories numbered on a progressive scale of ranking
from I to V.  The ranking was (and is) based on points awarded for publications,
teaching years and years and type of service for the University.  A minimum number
of points is required for teaching and research for each salary rank. An English
translation of the point scale is available on the web.
8  Professors of category II and
higher were allotted a fixed monthly salary plus additional payment equal for all
persons in each category.  The additional payment was obviously supplemented to
                                                   
7 A list of salary scales in effect is given at:
http://www.fjarsysla.is/rbh/rbh.nsf/pages/Leidbeiningar0008.html
8 See http://www.hi.is/Fel/FH/professorar/fp-matsreglurprofaensku.htmlimitate the overall model of the State Wage Term Committee, with the exception that
the additional payment is not fixed in the same discretionary manner as for other of
the Committees clients.  The State Wage Term Committee was obviously not ready to
deal with the controversy that such a differentiable decision would have created.
The State Wage Term Committee decision was well received by university
professors with few exceptions (mainly limited to the fields of engineering, law,
nursing, the humanities and business).  Furthermore, some older professors who had
devoted most of their time to developing facilities in their fields of study claimed that
their contributions had not been acknowledged.  Later revisions of the point system
took their complaints into consideration.
Unions and employers negotiate until agreement is reached on a list of salary
rates.  The rates include pay for regular work, overtime, working on holidays,
working under adverse conditions etc.  Unions and employers do not fix or limit the
total income accruable to employees.  In contrast, the State Wage Term Committee
has been keen on stressing that they not only set rates, but also an upper limit on total
remuneration payable.  In the case of professors, the State Wage Term Committee
ruled that overtime for teaching, research and university services should be subject to
an upper limit.  The limit was (and is) inversely related to the salary category.
Employees in lower categories can claim more overtime than those in higher
categories.
Complaints directed at the ruling of the State Wage Term Committee are
mostly related to the fact that the Committee sets the maximum salary that the
university, university firms and university research institutes can pay to a professor. A
professor with a somewhat higher than normal teaching load and supervision of two
or three postgraduate students could risk not being paid for additional work, such asthe evaluation of candidates for a new position in his or her department.  The example
extends to other tasks of a similar nature.  The State Wage Term Committee
maintained that evaluations of new applicants, service on university committees etc.
constitute part of the normal duties of a professor and as such, are supposed to be
covered by the fixed pay. Professors argued that compensation would be paid for the
evaluation of a colleague at a foreign institution and asked for an explanation of the
difference. A further complication is that according to University Council decisions
(that have now been partly reversed), the required base teaching load for professors
over 55 and 60 years of age is dramatically lower than that of their younger
colleagues.  A professor over age 60 could theoretically fullfil  requirements by
teaching two courses and advising two to four postgraduate students.  This fact made
it hard to distribute teaching and supervision duties amongst faculty members, as
younger faculty had to step in if the older faculty refused to teach above the payment
ceiling.
The State Wage Term Committee decision of July 2
nd 1998 implemented a
35% increase in average pay for professors.
9  Assistant and associate professors
(lecturers and senior lecturers) did not have an opening for new bargaining until 28
months later.
10 University Teachers’ Union members contacted the rector of the
University and expressed the view that the pay differential between professors and
                                                   
9 Before the State Wage Term Commitee decision, the average salary for a professor
was 145,000 krónur excluding overtime pay.  Average salary including overtime pay
was 255,000 krónur.  After the decision had taken effect fully, average salary without
overtime was 250,000 krónur and 341,000 krónur including overtime.
10 The signed agreement had October 31st 2000 as its termination date.docents and lecturers did not reflect differences in the quality of teaching and
research.  This was problematic for the UTU for obvious reasons.  The officers of the
union were elected on the assumption that they would use all allowed means to keep
the salary-development of members in line with the salary development of other
similar groups of employees.  The rector and the administration faced a different
problem.  With the pay differential, the advantages of promotion to a full
professorship were immense.  Applications for promotions began to pour in.  If this
trend continued, professors would dominate other categories of academic employees
by a factor of 3 to 1, and the rector reasoned that such a situation would shake the
credibility of the University promotion system.  Two possible actions were open in
order to keep the credibility of the system intact.  One would be to make the criteria
for promotion harder to fulfil, not a simple task in a university setting where
promotion decisions are taken partly by colleagues and partly by independent
committees.  The other possibility was to make the promotion less attractive from a
financial perspective.  As the salary decision for full professors was relegated to the
State Wage Term Committee, the only method would be to increase the wage levels
of lecturers and docents.
The rector met with UTU academic board members in July 1999.  The
conclusion of that meeting was to subject all UTU academic members to an
evaluation akin to the one prescribed by the State Wage Term Committee for full
professors.  Hence, the UTU board members accepted that salary changes could be
based on new methods for wage-determination for academic jobs.  On December 23,
1999, the University and the UTU signed an agreement that implemented a new
system for salary decisions for UTU members, based on the total number of points
earned for teaching, research and university service.IV.  Description of the system
The fundamental characteristic of the system is a numerically measured
assessment of academic personal.  Four areas of duties are defined:  teaching,
research, university administration/services and general services.  Points are awarded
for tasks belonging to each category.
Points are only implicitly defined.  Ten points per year seem to be a focal point of
sorts:  one year’s teaching experience yields ten teaching points and full professors
receive pecuniary awards if they produce more than ten research points.  The head of
a department is awarded ten service points for each year of service in that position.
11
Ten points are awarded for each year of tenure in a teaching job at a university-
level institution.  Furthermore, points can be awarded for publications.  Successful
supervision of postgraduate students qualifies for up to ten teaching points.  Lastly, a
person who has been instrumental in founding a program or a field at the university
can be awarded twenty-five points extra.
University service assessment is based on a list of duties.  For example, acting as
chair of a department is worth ten points a year, and acting as dean of a faculty is
worth fifty points. Research assessment is based on publications.  The most
noteworthy exception is that fifteen points are awarded for a MA/MS thesis and thirty
points for a Ph.D. thesis.  Books that present new or original material may be awarded
ten to sixty points, depending on the originality and amount of work.  Single author
                                                   
11papers in peer-reviewed international journals command fifteen points.  Points per
author decline as the number of authors increases, but not in a linear decline.  Single-
author papers in non-reviewed journals command ten points, as do single-author
edited proceedings at international conferences.  Other activities may qualify for
fewer points.  A very minor publication does not receive any points.
In late March 2000, some 110 of approximately 180 lecturers and docents had
submitted CV’s and been evaluated.  Average points for lecturers were 175 and
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Figure 1:  Distribution of points awarded to lecturers and docents, March 2000
  In both categories, the average number of points was higher than expected.  On
March 30
th 2000, the UTU and the University signed an agreement on how points
would affect salaries of UTU members.  According to the agreement, basic salarywould be directly affected by the total number of points awarded to each UTU
member.
The fact that the source of points did not have any significance represents a major
departure from the course taken by State Wage Term Committee, which kept
professors with relatively few research or teaching points at lower pay-levels than
professors with the same number of total points but more evenly distributed. One
should keep in mind that the implementation of the point system differed considerably
in the two cases.  In the full professor case, a professor in a given category has to have
earned a required minimum number of points in teaching and in research.  Hence,
considerable differences in salaries could be observed between two professors who
had earned an equal number of points, but where one had primarily earned points in
research, for example, while the other had points in all categories.  In the UTU
agreement, on the other hand, no distinction is made with regard to the origin of the
points.
UTU board members were pleased to learn that lecturers and docents from the
fields of the humanities, law, engineering and nursing were as likely to earn points as
were their colleagues from other disciplines.  As mentioned in the foregoing,
professors in the above-listed fields had previously challenged the State Wage Term
Committee decisions regarding full professors because they claimed that the point
system was inherently biased in their disfavour.  The UTU board members concluded
from the above evidence that the use of points in the case of the UTU agreement
demonstrated that this was not the case.V.  Agreement of the UTU, the University and Ministry of
Finance, spring 2001
The UTU/Ministry of Finance wage agreement came up for renewal on
November 1
st, 2000, as did the agreements of most university-educated
government employees.  The Union of High School Teachers adopted a highly
militant strategy at the outset, announcing a strike just ten days past the renewal
date.  The strike came into effect and lasted for ten weeks, effectively freezing all
negotiating activity of other unions in the public sector until an agreement was
signed in January 2001.  The new high-school teachers’ agreement implied an
overall rethinking of the mechanisms guiding salary decisions in the secondary
school system.  Basic pay was increased by as much as 50% and some of the
duties previously paid for separately were now covered by the basic salary.
Young teachers stood to gain more from the agreement than older teachers,
reflecting the demands employers, who felt that able young academics would not
find their remuneration attractive enough if the established age-profile of pay in
the teaching profession was to prevail.
At the outset of negotiations, the strike and the new pay-profile of
high-school teachers marked a starting point for the demands of the UTU.
However, the negotiating team of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Education were not ready to accept this position.  They pointed out that the high-
school teachers’ pay increase was partly offset by an easing of the rules and by
including in the basic duties of a high-school teacher a number of duties that had
previously been paid for separately.  After some dramatic events, the UTU
managed to convince their negotiation partners that the point system was an
adequate, efficient and productive way of remunerating university teachers.Consequently, its implementation resulted in some flexibility. Older lecturers and
docents were still more likely to be in the higher percentiles in the UTU income
distribution, but nothing excluded the possibility that the highest paid UTU
member could be one of its youngest members, since pay was strictly based on
earned points and points earned by teaching service did not necessarily need to
weigh heavily in the total.  The one complaint the employers had was that new
points did not have more weight than old points.  There was (and is) no
depreciation or loss of acquired points in the system.  Finally, a common ground
was reached (preventing an announced strike during the spring exam period).
The solution implied a multitude of changes.  The respective weights of
research, teaching and university service were changed from 40%, 48%, 12% to
43%, 51% and 6%. This change implies that a 35-year old UTU member would
now be required to teach and prepare teaching for 817 hours a year, an increase of
38 hours, which effectively reduces overtime payment to all UTU members.
Furthermore, pay for the research part of the job would vary.   A bonus of as much
as 20% can be paid if the average of research points over the previous three years
is in excess of 40 points per year.
VI.  Implementation of the system
Figure 2 shows the distribution of points awarded to lecturers, docents and
professors.  Professors have earned more points on average than have docents,





























The figure demonstrates that the median teacher at the University of Iceland has
earned 500 to 600 points in total.  It also shows that the distribution of points among
assistant and associated professors (lecturers and docents) is much narrower than the
distribution of points among full professors.
Table 2 gives the quartiles of the distribution of total points by field and by level
of employment, as of early February 2002.
Table 2:  The Quartiles of distribution of total points awarded to university teachers









Medicine 30 275 371.1 475 15.83
Humanities 325 475 604.3 850 2.62
Social sciences 115 400 508.8 750 6.52
Sciences 275 512.5 584.7 750 2.73
ProfessorsMedicine 550 850 877.8 1250 2.27
Humanities 650 850 873.5 1100 1.69
Social sciences 493.8 750 835.7 1250 2.53
Sciences 550 750 806.7 1050 1.91
All 550 850 846.9 1150 2.09
Docents
Medicine 136.3 275 279.5 375 2.75
Humanities 337.5 400 419.3 475 1.41
Social sciences 225 375 319.3 462.5 2.06
Sciences 190 375 324 425 2.24
All 225 325 317.2 425 1.89
Lecturers
Medicine 30 50 101.8 177.5 5.92
Humanities 155 225 263 350 2.26
Social sciences 40 120 115 155 3.88
Sciences 30 185 150 185 6.17
All 30 130 141.4 185 6.17
Table 2 shows that 25% of all university teachers in the Humanities who had their
work evaluated had accrued 325 points or less.  Half of them had accumulated total
points in the range of 325 to 850.
One way of evaluating the unevenness of the distribution of points is to consider
the ratio of the third quartile to the first quartile.  Note that the distribution of points
among teachers in the field of medicine is the most uneven.  With the exception of
lecturers, it is obvious that the distribution of points among teachers of the same rank
in medicine in particular is not more uneven than the distribution of points among
teachers of similar rank in other fields.  Hence, the uneven distribution of points in
medicine is the result of a high percentage of teachers of the lowest rank (lecturers) in
that field, and the fact that lecturers in medicine tend to have accumulated fewer
points than their peers in other fields.  This difference can largely be explained by
institutional factors as well as a self-selection bias.  A majority of lecturers anddocents in medicine are part-time teachers, even if they hold the title of full-time
university employees.
Aside from the anomalies discussed in connection with the distribution of the
points among teachers in the field of medicine, the finding is that the distribution of
points is similar from field to field.  Ignoring the field of medicine, one can state that
the median professor has accumulated 800 points during tenure, whereas the median
associate professor (docent) has accumulated 400 points.  The picture is somewhat
more diffuse for assistant professors (lecturers), as social science lecturers tend to
have accumulated few points.  The reason for this might be that the social sciences
constitute a field that is both young and rapidly expanding over recent years.  Hence,
its employees are newly recruited.
VII.  Conclusion.
The total number of research points awarded yields a method to measure the overall
research activity at the University of Iceland.  The number of points increased by 15%
between 1999 and 2000 and by 10% between 2000 and 2001.  It appears that fewer
points were awarded in 2002 than in 2001 but it is still too early to conclude why that
is the case.
The UTU adapted and developed the salary system initially established by the
full professors and the State Wage Term Committee.   The aims of the UTU were to
bring the salaries of its members closer to the salaries of full professors and further, to
develop a remuneration system that could serve as a platform for further bettering the
salary situation of its members.
The aim of the University and the Ministry of Finance was to use the
remuneration system to enhance the production of research at the University of
Iceland.  The overall growth of research points awarded indicates that the experimentis a success.  So far, the transformation of the remuneration system at the University
of Iceland has delivered according to the hopes and expectations on both sides of the
negotiation table.  Time will tell if the negotiating parties can continue to develop the
system further for their mutual benefit.
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